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Abstract:  
In the informal economy of developing countries, female entrepreneurs face a 
comparative disadvantage for operating high-productivity activities, owing to the 
prevalence of patriarchal forms of business regulations. Yet, for microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) to succeed in enhancing female empowerment, increased access 
to credit must enable female entrepreneurs to tap into the range of high-productivity 
activities. So when the costs of legality are too high in developing countries, and the 
informal economy becomes the only affordable venue for operating a business 
venture, this paper shows that access to microfinance services becomes only 
necessary, but not sufficient for female empowerment. Based upon a game-theoretic 
model of activity choices by ex ante homogenous women, we argue that conditioning 
well-trained women’s access to credit to the adoption of high-productivity activities 
may enable MFIs to induce the emergence of networks of female entrepreneurs large 
enough to mitigate patriarchal practices that raise the costs of operating such 
activities in the informal economy. 
 
Keywords: Microfinance, female entrepreneurship, supermodular games 
 
JEL Classification:  D13, J16 
 
I. Introduction
This paper oﬀers a new perspective on the empowerment potential of microfinance insti-
tutions targeted at women. It develops a theory of female empowerment through access
to business loans in an environment where informality is the only aﬀordable venue for
operating a business venture. Its aim is to examine the choices of activity informal fe-
male entrepreneurs make when faced with patriarchal forms of business regulations that
substitute for the absence of legal means for enforcing contracts in the informal economy.
Basic economic theory supporting the empowerment potential of microfinance targeted
at women emphasizes access to credit and the resulting opportunity for earning an inde-
pendent income as the theoretical links to female empowerment through microfinance. In
other words, involvement in income-generating activities should translate into greater em-
powerment for women. But, female empowerment is about improved ability to bring about
changes that enhance women’s well-being at the household, community, and national lev-
els.1 Bringing about such well-being requires that women first acquire the power to change
their social environment. Whether women can gain such power at individual, community
or national levels obviously depends on a number of factors, including social, political, in-
stitutional, as well as purely economic, such as access to microfinance services. How these
factors interact to aﬀect female empowerment, therefore, warrant due consideration. Here
is why.
First, in many developing countries, business formalization in order to access legal
means for enforcing contracts is often a privilege available only to politically powerful
entrepreneurs, given the prevalence in these countries of high costs of legality.2 Figure 1
1Esther Duflo (2005) oﬀers an alternative definition. She defines female empowerment as the improve-
ment in the ability of women to access the constituents of development–in particular health, education,
earning opportunities, rights, and political participation.
2De Soto (1989) finds evidence that the process of legally registering a small business is to expensive for
any person of small means in Peru. Fortin, Marceau and Savard (1997) find evidence of high costs of legality
in a case study of Cameroon. Johnson and Kaufmann (2000) find that bribes and corruption are reasons
why firms hide in the unoﬃcial economy. Djankov et al. (2002) also provide evidence that countries with
heavier regulation of entry have larger informal sectors. They argue that such entry barriers are deliberately
set by politicians who seek to create extractable rents by restricting entry into formal markets.
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below presents a comparative illustration of these costs for a sample of countries, including
Sub-Saharan African countries and OECD countries. In terms of days lost dealing with
licensing, Figure 1 shows clearly that in average, a potential formal sector entrepreneur in
Sub-Saharan Africa loses about three times as many days dealing with licensing as does
his counterpart from any advanced industrialized country.
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Figure 1. Dealing with licence: Time Spent in  Days
Source: The World Bank 2005
For the vast majority of these countries’ micro-entrepreneurs—including women— who
cannot aﬀord these high cost of legality (bribes collection by public oﬃcials are an example),
the informal economy becomes a “getaway”–a framework for producing and/or selling
legal goods albeit using illegal means.3
3According to a 2002 survey sponsored by the International Labour Organization (ILO), excluding South
Africa, the share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment is 78 per cent in sub-Saharan
Africa.
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Second, in the informal economy, patriarchal forms of business regulations substitute
for the absence of legal means for enforcing business contracts,4 and often emphasize the
use of threat and violence as an enforcement mechanism (de Soto 1989). Relative to men,
this institutional feature of the informal economy put women at a comparative disadvan-
tage for accessing certain lucrative markets (Gibbon 1995; Kabeer 2001). For example,
relative to male entrepreneurs, women may face limited access to crucial input markets
necessary to eﬀectively operate a high-productivity business venture. Example include la-
bor markets– where lack of legal mechanisms for resolving contract disputes may exposed
female micro-entrepreneurs to male employees’ violence–, and fertilizers markets–which
are often controlled by male-only cooperatives. Due to these patriarchal practices, de-
veloping countries women still face trade-oﬀ that cause them to make decisions that are
arguably disempowering, such as clustering in low-productivity activities, and/or relying
on male family members (often their husband) as contract enforcers (Kabeer 2001)5
Third, notwithstanding the above, intrahousehold bargaining models have demon-
strated that female empowerment is positively associated with the level of a woman’s
fall-back option, which, in turn, is shown to rise with her relative earned-income (e.g.,
Anderson and Eswaran 2005; Basu 2005). Yet, in the informal economy of developing
countries, women continue to earn less than men, even when controlling for diﬀerences
in literacy and education. In Bangladesh–a country that pioneered MFIs targeted at
women–, there is evidence that self-employed men earn more than three times the in-
come earned by self-employed women, while male informal micro-entrepreneurs earn about
4Business contracts are usually defined as means for organizing and transfering property rights (De
Soto 1989).
5Lost of bargaining power may, for example, force her to surrender a fraction of her venture capital to
her husband in exchange for his services as her informal contract enforcer (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996).
Or, it may take the form of lost of control over her fertility (Kritz and Makinwa-Adebusoye 2000), which
may raise the costs of operating a relatively high-risk, high-return business venture, thereby reducing her
earned income. In particular, Kritz and Makinwa-Adebusoye (2000) studied women’s status and fertility
within married couples in five Nigerian ethnic groups (The Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba, Ijaw and Kanuri). They
look at several dimensions of women’s decision-making and spousal communication on the desire for more
children, and wife say on family planning. Among other things, their studies finds that spouses from groups
in which women’s status is lowest (e.g. Kanuri and the Hausa) have higher disagreement on fertility desires
than those from ethnic groups in which women’s status is higher (Yoruba, Ibo, and Ijaw).
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four times more than their female counterparts (Dasgupta and Barbattini, 2003). In Fig-
ure 2 below, this gender disparity in earnings among self-employed agents is shown to be
apparent in other developing countries as well:
Figure 2. Informal Economy: Women's earnings as a % of Men's among Self-Employed, by 
Country
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Most of this disparity reflects the extent to which women enterprises diﬀer from men’s in
terms of scale, items sold by traders, extent of diversification, access to eﬀective network-
ing (Kabeer, 2001). Given the prevalence of patriarchal practices in the informal economy,
networking among female entrepreneurs may play an essential role in overcoming transac-
tion costs induced by compliance with such practices. Understanding constraints to the
emergence of large enough networks of female entrepreneurs can therefore shed light on
the issue of female empowerment through microfinance.
In this paper, we use a game-theoretic model to highlight coordination failure that hin-
der the emergence of networks of female entrepreneurs necessary to overcome patriarchal
business practices that limit female entrepreneurs’ access to high-productivity informal
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activities. In our model, women’s entrepreneurship is assisted by an MFI which provides
loan and training to all their clients. We focus on women’s demand for venture capital and
choice of activity as jointly determined by their ability to mitigate the transaction costs
that limit their access to more productive business activities. In our model, a female en-
trepreneur must jointly choose the type of business activity she plans to operate informally
and its size as determined by the amount of capital borrowed from the MFI of her choice.
Operating a high-productivity informal activity puts a higher demand on a woman to link
up with other women operating the same type of activity in order to generate collective
resources necessary to overcome obstacles created by patriarchal business practices. The
more there are female entrepreneurs operating in such a network, the more able will this
network be in enhancing women’s success at operating high-productivity activities. Con-
sequently, an essential feature of the environment underlying women’s entrepreneurship
in the informal economy is the complementarity of their respective business strategies:
a female entrepreneur’s decision to tap into the range of high-productivity activities in-
creases other female entrepreneurs’ marginal gain from following suit. In absence of a
mechanism for inducing coordination of women’s decision to link up in a such a network,
the non-cooperative game these women play admits two pure-strategy Nash-equilibria: a
high-income equilibrium where all of them operate high-productivity informal activities,
and a low-income equilibrium where they all remain confined into low-productivity ones,
despite access to credit. Therefore, when the low-income Nash-equilibrium obtains despite
women’s improved access to credit, it must be that microfinance assistance to female en-
trepreneurship has failed to act as a coordination mechanism for the emergence of large
enough networks of female entrepreneurs operating high-productivity activities.
From an empirical point of view, there is a case that women’s attempt to access high-
productivity business activities may be subject to strategic complementarities. Available
evidence reveals that most women who receive loans from microfinance institutions tend to
be confined into low-productivity, low-capital activities, despite access to credit, and often
despite having equal managerial credentials as men. In a case study of Bangladesh, Kabeer
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(2001) reports that while access to credit succeeded in increasing the rate at which women
participated in economic activities, it failed, however, to increase the range of economic
activities they have access to. Lairap-Fonderson (2002), in a case study of Cameroon and
Kenya, finds similar evidence. She argues that women micro-entrepreneurs are clustered
within a narrow range of activities that oﬀer virtually no opportunity for innovation, or
for upgrading to more-lucrative ventures. This includes street-vending, operating food
kiosks, selling second-hand clothes and unprocessed food, which are relatively low-capital,
low-productivity activities, but which, in addition, face strong competition from cheap
imports. She concludes that microfinance fail to lift women out of the confine of such
low-capital activities. In a case study of Zimbabwe, Gibbon (1995) finds that rural women
business activities tend to remain at a survival level, despite assistance from microfinance
institutions.
Our research is related to a growing theoretical literature focusing on women’s em-
powerment through participation in income-generating activities. Anderson and Eswaran
(2005) develop an intrahousehold bargaining model which demonstrates the relative ability
of earned income to nurture empowerment for women within the household. The model
is tested to rural Bangladeshi data, which provides support for their model’s prediction.
McIntosh and Wydick (2005) develop a model of competition among potential entrants in
the microfinance industry that highlights the misgivings of increased competition in terms
of the performance and viability of microfinance institutions. Carter and Fletschner (2004)
build a model of women’s demand for entrepreneurial capital that explicitly incorporates
into women’s decision-making the eﬀect of social norms prescribing gender behavior. They
use this model to argue that microcredit programs that relax women’s capital supply con-
straints may have benefits that extend well beyond the direct beneficiaries. Our research
builds around this literature by emphasizing the need to explicitly organize female en-
trepreneurs in large enough business networks capable of mitigating patriarchal business
practices that confine women in low-productivity activities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The model is presented and solved in
6
section 2. Section 3 oﬀers concluding remarks.
II. The Environment
There are N > 0 ex ante homogenous female entrepreneurs. Each female entrepreneur has
a choice between a range of business activities indexed each by its degree of productivity,
p ∈ [0, 1].6 To start up a business venture of any type, women in this environment can
borrow venture capital from an MFI of their choice.7 Borrowed capital determines the size
of the venture. Denote as k ∈
£
k, k¯
¤
the loan obtained by a female entrepreneur, with
0 < k < k¯ < +∞.
All business operations take place in the informal economy. In that economy, owing
to the prevalence of patriarchal forms of business regulations, each female informal en-
trepreneur may face gender-specific transaction costs, unless she can joint a network of
business women large enough to overcome these costs. Let n ∈ [0, N ] denote the cardi-
nality of the subset of female informal entrepreneurs who are connected with one another
through a business network (say a cooperative or any business association). Each female
entrepreneur member of that network will face a level,
tc = ϕ (n, p) pk, (II.1)
of transaction costs reflecting the extent to which the network she belongs to is unable to
eliminate her comparative disadvantage for being a female informal entrepreneur. These
transactions costs are assumed to increase with size, k, and the degree of productivity, p,
of the business venture.
6Examples of activities including the vending of perishable goods (such as fruits and vegetables), and the
vending of non- perishable goods (such as household appliances, furnitures, and other consumer durables).
7Microfinance programs generally foster self-employment.
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Assumption 1. The function ϕ satisfies the following properties:
ϕ (n, p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if n > en (p)
δ if n ≤ en (p) (II.2)
where en (p) ∈ (1, N ] denotes the critical mass of connected female informal en-
trepreneurs above which networking become successful in eliminating gender-specific
transaction costs in the informal economy.
Assumption 1 implies that unless the size of the network of female informal entrepreneurs
is large enough, transaction costs induced by the prevalence of patriarchal forms of business
regulations will not disappear.
Assumption 2. The function en (.) is strictly increasing and satisfies the following bound-
ary conditions: (i) en (0) = 0; (ii) 1 < en (1) < N .
That en (p) is bounded below by 0 means that a female entrepreneur who elects to
capitalize a business venture with the lowest degree of productivity (i.e., p = 0) faces
no transaction cost whether or not she operates in autarky. However that en (1) > 1,
means that no female informal entrepreneur acting in autarky can avoid gender-specific
transaction costs when she chooses to informally operate a business venture with the highest
degree of productivity (i.e., p = 1).
Next, denote as φ (p, k) the gross revenue generated by a female informal entrepreneur
who uses her loan, k, to invest in a business activity with degree of productivity, p. We
make the following Assumption:
Assumption 3. The function φ satisfies the following properties: for all p, and all k,
(i) φp > 0, k given;
(ii) φk > 0, p given;
(iii) φpk = φkp > 0
(iv) φkk < 0.
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Assumption 3 states that the function φ is strictly increasing in p (property i) and in
k (property ii). It also states that the function φ has increasing diﬀerences in (p, k) on the
feasible domain (property iii), and that φ is strictly concave.
A. Choice of Business Size
In this subsection, we are interested in characterizing female entrepreneurs’ choice of busi-
ness size. Let r denote the rental rate of capital pre-determined by the assisting MFI.
Denote as π (k, p, er) the residual claimed by a female entrepreneur who operates an infor-
mal business venture with degree of productivity, p, and size, k, when the marginal cost of
borrowing an additional unit of capital is
er = r + ϕ (n, p) p, (II.3)
where equation (II.3) makes use of equation (II.1). Therefore we can write π (k, p, er) as
follows:
π (k, p, er) = φ (p, k)− erk. (II.4)
Next, consider a female informal entrepreneur decision problem. Given the pair (n, r), a
typical female informal entrepreneur sequential decision problem is to choose (i) the degree
of productivity, p, of the business she plans to run, and (ii) the loan level, k ∈
£
k, k¯
¤
,
necessary to capitalize the venture. Her objective is to maximize her residual claim defined
in (II.4). It will be assumed that each female entrepreneur solves her three-stage problem
by backward induction.
Let K (p, er) ≡ argmaxk π (k, p, er) be the optimal loan size chosen by a female informal
entrepreneur when the state of the world is described by the pair (p, er). And suppose that
this optimal loan size is interior. The Implicit function theorem may be applied to establish
the following result:
9
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 3 hold. Then
(i) ∂∂pK (p, er) > 0.
(ii) ∂∂erK (p, er) < 0.
Part (i) of Lemma 1 states that if a female entrepreneur plans to run a more productive
activity, it is optimal for her to increase her demand for capital, otherwise she will not
maximize the return to entrepreneurship. Part (ii) states that a return-maximizing female
entrepreneur will always reduce her demand for capital as a result of an exogenous increase
in the marginal cost of capital. Lemma 1 will prove useful for characterizing a female
informal entrepreneur’s choice of the degree of productivity of the business venture she
plans to operate. Since all women in this environment have access to credit, we characterize
this choice as dependent upon relevant socioeconomic characteristics of the environment
in which these women live.
B. Choice of Business Activity by Female Informal Entrepreneurs
In this subsection we study a female informal entrepreneur’s choice of the degree of produc-
tivity, p, of the business venture she plans to operate in an environment where a collective
action by women entrepreneurs is necessary to eliminate gender-specific transaction costs
that severely constrain this choice. We assume that the objective pursued through such a
choice is the maximization of the return to entrepreneurship.
Let πˆ (n, p) ≡ π [K (p, er) , p, er] denotes the return to entrepreneurship earned by a female
entrepreneur who joins a business network of size n when she chooses an activity with degree
of productivity, p. Then
πˆ (n, p) = φ [p,K (p, er)]− erK (p, er) (II.5)
with er as defined in (II.3). The following proposition formalizes the incentive for female
entrepreneurs to operate business ventures with a high degree of productivity.
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Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. If n > en (p), for all p ∈ [0, 1], then argmaxp π¯ (p) =
1.
Proof. Observe that if n > en (p), for all p ∈ [0, 1], then ϕ (n, p) = 0, and, using (II.5),
it can be shown that the return to entrepreneurship earned by a typical female informal
entrepreneur reduces to
π¯ (p) = φ [p,K (p, r)]− rK (p, r) . (II.6)
Therefore, it suﬃces to establish that π¯0 (p) > 0, for all p. The proof follows directly
from the application of the envelope theorem to (II.6) given that Assumptions 1-3 hold
simultaneously·
Proposition 1 states that if gender-specific transaction costs were to be eliminated (i.e.,
n = N), access to credit would provide female entrepreneurs with an incentive to tap into
the range of highly productive informal activities usually controlled by men. In other words,
a return-maximizing female informal entrepreneur will always select a business activity
with degree of productivity, p = 1. Proposition 2 therefore highlights the importance
for women, as a group, to overcome patriarchal forms of business regulations that put
them at a comparative disadvantage in managing highly productive informal activities.
When such forms of business regulations are overcome by women, the optimal return to
entrepreneurship is given by
π¯ (1) = φ [1, K (1, r)]− rK (1, r) . (II.7)
Now, suppose instead that for some reason, no female entrepreneur can link up with
enough other female entrepreneurs in a business network when she chooses to run an
activity with degree of productivity, p ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, n ≤ en (p), for all p ∈ [0, 1].
How would this fact aﬀect her optimal decision on the level of p? The following proposition
provides an answer to that question:
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions 1-3 hold simultaneously. Suppose in addition that for
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all feasible pairs (p, k)
φp ≤ δk. (II.8)
If
n ≤ en (p) , (II.9)
for all p ∈ [0, 1], then argmaxp πˆ (n, p) = 0.
Proof. Observe from (II.5) that if n ≤ en (p), the return to entrepreneurship becomes
π (p) = φ [p,K (p, r + δp)]− [r + δp]K (p, r + δp) . (II.10)
It then suﬃces to show that π (.) is a strictly decreasing function. The proof follows as an
implication of the envelope theorem, using condition (II.8). Hence the maximum obtains
at the corner p = 0.
Condition (II.8) states that, when they exist, gender-specific transaction costs, as mea-
sured by the lower bound, δk, are suﬃciently high. Proposition 2 formalizes the observed
overrepresentation of women entrepreneurs in low-productivity informal activities. It ex-
plains this overrepresentation by the prevalence in the informal economy of patriarchal
forms of business regulations that substitute for the absence in that economy of legal
means for enforcing contracts. A very important remark follows from Proposition 2. As
an implication of Proposition 2, the optimal return to entrepreneurship when en (p) ≥ n,
for all p is
π (0) = φ [0,K (0, r)]− rK (0, r) (II.11)
To highlight the empowerment potential of microfinance, it is important to obtain a ranking
of the returns π¯ (1) and π (0) as defined by Equations (II.7) and (II.11), respectively. The
following result obtained as a corollary to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. Given r as pre-determined by the microfinance institution, the following
inequality obtain:
π (0) < π¯ (1) . (II.12)
12
Corollary 1 formalizes female entrepreneurs’ incentive to use their access to credit in
order to capitalize informal activities with a high degree of productivity. In other words,
if all female entrepreneurs knew that enough other female entrepreneurs will choose to
capitalize an activity of type p = 1–which is the informal activity with the highest degree
of productivity–they will each elect to capitalize that activity because it maximizes their
return to entrepreneurship: π¯ (1) > π (0). However, since each woman is anonymous, she
may not know, prior to choosing any activity p, how many other women will link up with
her in the business network spanned by that activity. If she chooses p = 1, on the basis
that π (0) < π¯ (1), she may indeed earn a return π¯ (1), if the total number, n, of female
entrepreneurs in the business network spanned by activity p = 1 is large enough: n > en (1).
However, if n ≤ en (1), then she will earn a return
π (1) = φ [1, K (1, r + δ)]− (r + δ)K (1, r + δ) , (II.13)
which, by proposition 2, is less than π (0):
π (1) < π (0)
since π (p) is a decreasing function of p.
Whether or not n > en (1) becomes crucial for the optimality of the business strategy of
choosing p = 1. Thus, a typical female entrepreneur’s decision whether or not to capitalize
an activity of type p = 1 becomes a strategic reaction to what other female entrepreneurs
choose as their business strategy. In other words, women’s activity choice strategies are
complement. How many women will choose to use their access to credit in order to tap
into activities of type p can therefore be viewed as the outcome of a non-cooperative game
between the N women living in the targeted environment. In what follows, we analyze the
women’s activity choice game in its normal form.
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C. The Activity Choice Game
Each woman entrepreneur is indexed by i, with i ∈ I, where I = {1, ...., N} denotes the
set of women living in this environment. On the basis of Propositions 1 and 2, women
in this environment have a choice between two types of informal activities: either a low-
productivity one indexed by 0, or a high-productivity one indexed by 1. Thus, we can
define Pi = {0, 1} as the strategy set for woman i ∈ I, with generic element pi ∈ Pi. We
interpret pi as woman i’s activity choice strategy.
Let P = ×i∈IPi denote the strategy space, whose elements p = (pi, p−i) ∈ P define a
strategy profile of the activity choice game. Let P−i = ×{j∈I; j 6=i}Pj be the set of feasible
joint strategies for all women other than woman i, with generic element p−i ∈ P−i. Observe
that since Pi is finite for all i, P is also finite and contains a total of 2N elements.
C.1. The Payoﬀ Function
To construct each player’s payoﬀ function, we make use of expressions (II.7), (II.11), and
(II.13). On the basis of Propositions 1 and 2, if player i selects the activity choice strategy
pi = 0, she will earn a payoﬀ π (0) as specified by (II.11), irrespective of the activity choices
of other players, because π (0) = π¯ (0). In contrast, if she plays the strategy pi = 1, she
will earn a return Π (n) depending upon the strategy profile selected by her rivals, where
Π (n) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
π¯ (1) if n > en (1)
π (1) if n ≤ en (1) (II.14)
Observe that since π (1) < π (0) < π¯ (1), clearly playing the strategy pi = 1 is never a
dominant strategy for any player of this game.
Now, let Vi : P → < denote woman i’s payoﬀ function. Therefore, we can define a
typical woman-entrepreneur payoﬀ as follows:
Vi (pi, p−i) = piΠ (n) + (1− pi)π (0) (II.15)
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where
n =
NX
j=1
pi (II.16)
denotes the size of the network of female entrepreneurs who choose to play the activity
choice strategy pi = 1. Thus, if woman i plays the strategy pi = 0, she will gain a payoﬀ
Vi (0, p−i) = π (0) ,
irrespective of what other women do. However, if she plays pi = 1, she will gain a payoﬀ
Vi (1, p−i) = Π (n) ,
which is dependent upon the level of n as determined by the the strategy profile p−i selected
by players other than player i, where Π (n) is as defined in (II.14).
A non-cooperative normal-form game is the triple Ω = hI, P, {Vi : i ∈ I}i , consisting of
a non-empty set of players I, a set P of feasible joint decision strategies, and a collection
of payoﬀ functions {Vi : i ∈ I} . Since all players have identical strategy spaces (P1 = P2 =
... = PN) and for all i, j ∈ {1, ...., N}, Vi (p) = Vj (p) , for all i 6= j , the normal-form game
Ω is symmetric.
C.2. Nash-equilibria.
In this sub-section, we characterize the set of Nash equilibria when all women make their
business-activity decision simultaneously. We define a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
terms of the payoﬀs players receive from various strategy profiles:
Definition 1. A pure-strategy profile p∗ ∈ P is a Nash equilibrium of Ω if and only if
Vi (p∗) ≥ Vi
¡
pi, p∗−i
¢
for all pi ∈ Pi and all i ∈ I.
Let ℵΩ denote the set of Nash equilibria of the game. Let pL ∈ P and pH ∈ P be feasible
strategy profiles, where pL (respectively pH) is the strategy profile such that each woman
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i ∈ I chooses an activity of type pi = 0 (respectively pi = 1). The following proposition is
proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 3. Let Assumptions 1-3. Then,
©
pL, pH
ª
∈ ℵΩ.
Proposition 3 states that the strategy profile where all women elect to stay within the
confine of low-capital, less productive economic activities (i.e., the profile pL) and the one
where all of them elect to tap into high-capital, high-productivity activities (i.e., the profile
pH) belong to the set of Nash-equilibria of the women’s business-decision game, Ω.
Before we proceed to derive further policy implications from the above result, we must
address the question of whether the strategy profiles pL and pH are indeed the only stable
equilibria of the symmetric game, Ω. To address this issue, we first show that Ω is a
supermodular game (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), also known as a game characterized by
strategic complementarities.
Definition 2. (Milgrom and Roberts [1990]) Ω is a supermodular game, if for all i,
(i) Pi is a compact subset of <;
(ii) Vi is upper semi-continuous in pi, for each fixed p−i;
(iii) Vi is continuous in p−i, for each fixed pi;
(iv) Vi has a finite upper bound ;
(v) Vi has increasing diﬀerences in (pi, p−i) on Pi × P−i.
In particular, property (v) of Definition 2 implies that for a player i, the incremental
gain from taking her highest action is higher, when players other than herself also take
their highest action: for all p0i > pi and all p0−i > p−i,
Vi
¡
p0i, p0−i
¢
− Vi
¡
pi, p0−i
¢
≥ Vi (p0i, p−i)− Vi (pi, p−i) .
Our interest in supermodular games stems from several crucial properties these games
have. First, the main characteristic of models with strategic complementarities is the
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possible presence of multiple equilibria, creating the possibility for coordination failures
(Diamond, 1982; Cooper and John, 1988). Second, with a supermodular game, there is
no need to rely on mixed-strategies for the existence of a Nash equilibrium, as existence
of equilibrium of such game does not require continuity of best response functions (i.e.,
application of Tarski’s fixed point theorem). Third, as an implication of supermodularity,
we can restrict the search for equilibria to pure-strategy Nash-equilibria. only, since mixed-
strategies equilibria, when they exist, are unstable (Echenique and Edlin, 2004).
To show that the women’s business-decision game, Ω, is supermodular, it suﬃces to
prove that properties (i) − (v) above are satisfied. The following Proposition, which is
proved in Appendix B, establishes this result.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-3, the symmetric game Ω, is supermodular.
Proposition 4 implies that conditions underlying Topkis’ theorem apply so that for the
game Ω, women’s best replies are increasing in opponents’ actions: for each
βi (p−i) ∈ argmaxpi Vi (p) ,
and for all p0−i > p−i, βi
¡
p0−i
¢
≥ βi (p−i), all i.
Now since the βi (p−i) are increasing, to rule out asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equi-
libria, we show in the following Lemma–which we prove in Appendix C–, that women’s
best reply are single-valued correspondences (i.e., each βi is a function):
Lemma 2. Let βi (p−i) = {pi : pi ∈ argmaxpi∈Pi Vi (pi, p−i)}, for all i, given p−i. Then,
under Assumptions 1-3, βi (p−i) is a singleton.
Lemma 2 states that players best replies are single-valued. This result, combined with
our above application of Topkis’ theorem rules out the existence of asymmetric pure-
strategy Nash equilibria for the women’s occupational choice game. Hence the following
Proposition:
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1-3,
©
pL, pH
ª
= ℵΩ.
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Proposition 5 states that the strategy profile where all women elect to stay within the
confine of low-productivity economic activities and the one where all of them elect to tap
into high-productivity activities are the only pure-strategy Nash-equilibria of the activity-
choice game, Ω. This multiplicity of equilibria suggests a potential role for a deliberate
action to select one of the equilibria. Such deliberate action is desirable, however, only if the
two equilibria can be ranked according to the Pareto principle. The following Proposition
establishes this ranking.
Proposition 6. Under Assumptions 1-3, the symmetric pure-strategy profile pH Pareto
dominates the profile pL.
Proof. To prove this Proposition, it suﬃces to show that for all i ∈ I, and for all
pi ∈ Pi, Vi
¡
pH
¢
− Vi
¡
pL
¢
> 0. Let ∆i ≡ Vi ¡pH¢ − Vi ¡pL¢ . From the definition of the
payoﬀ function Vi, the diﬀerence ∆i reduces to
∆i = π¯ (1)− π (0)
Since en (1) ∈ (1, N), by Assumption 2, the result simply follows from Corollary 1. This
completes the proof.
Proposition 6 states that the strategy profile where all women elect to operate high-
productivity business ventures in the informal economy is strictly preferred to the one where
all women elect to stay within the confine of low-productivity activities. Because the high-
income equilibrium (i.e., pH), is counter-intuitive in many poor countries where women are
generally confined to low-productivity business activities, our analysis therefore suggests
that in these societies, coordination failures in women’s activity choice decisions are to be
blamed. Such a coordination failure prevents women from creating large enough business
networks likely to enable them to overcome patriarchal forms of business regulations that
put them at a comparative disadvantage, relative to men, at managing high-productivity
business ventures in the informal economy.
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III. Concluding Remarks
This paper had two important related goals. The first was to explore the implications for
women’s choice of activity and demand for capital, of the interaction between economic and
social factors. Improved access to credit and informality were the main economic factors
underlying women’s business decision in our model, while the prevalence in the informal
economy of patriarchal forms of business regulations highlights the social context under-
lying this decision. The second goal was to investigate necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for microfinance to nurture empowerment for women. We drew from the existing literature
in assuming that women’s earned income from entrepreneurship was a determining factor
of their empowerment. For that purpose, we use a game-theoretic framework featuring a
supermodular game of activity choice between ex ante homogenous female entrepreneurs.
We demontrated that this game admits two pure-strategy, Pareto-ranked, symmetric Nash-
equilibria as its only possible outcomes. The equilibrium where all women elect to operate
high-productivity business ventures in the informal economy was shown to be strictly pre-
ferred to the one where all of them elect to stay within the confine of low-productivity
activities. Therefore, whereever microfinance has failed to empower women–in the sense
of enhancing their involvement in high-productivity activities–, we concluded that it may
be because of coordination failure that prevent women from creating business networks
large enough to mitigate patriarchal forms of business regulations that put them at a com-
parative disadvantage, relative to men, at managing high-productivity business ventures.
We found that a suﬃcient condition for MFIs to succeed in nurturing female empowerment
is that women’s access to credit be conditioned to their adoption of high-productivity infor-
mal activities. Such conditionality will act as a coordination mechanism, allowing female
entrepreneurs to organize in large enough networks that raise women’s gains from oper-
ating high-productivity activities in the informal economy. The role of these networks
will be to mitigate patriarchal practices that raise the costs of operating such activities.
Finally, our analysis shows the importance of including the social context underlying the
implementation of development projects targeted at women.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 3.
The proof is divided in two claims:
Claim 1 The strategy profile pL =
¡
pL1 , ....pLi , ....pLN
¢
such that pi = 0 for all i ∈ I, is a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of Ω.
Proof: Using (II.15) and the definition of a Nash-equilibria, it follows from definition
1 that, the profile pL is a pure-strategy SNE of Ω if and only if the following condition is
always satisfied for all i:
π (0)−Π (1) ≥ 0 (III.1)
Since en (1) > 1, the result then clearly follows from the strictly decreasing property of the
function π (as an implication of proposition 2), i.e., π (0) > π (1). Hence the result
Claim 2. The strategy profile pH =
¡
pH1 , ....pHi , ....pHN
¢
such that pi = 1 for all i ∈ I, is a
pure strategy NE of Ω
Proof: With inequality (II.12) in hands, the proof follows in the same manner as in
claim 1. This completes the proof of proposition 3.
B. Proof of Proposition 4.
To prove proposition 4, first, observe that for all i, Pi = {0, 1} , is clearly a compact
subset of <, since pi is closed and bounded. Therefore property (i) of a supermodular game
is trivially satisfied. Second, to establish property (ii) and (iii), it suﬃces to prove the
following claim:
Claim 1. For all i ∈ I, the function Vi : P → <, is continuous on P , where P = ×i∈Ipi.
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Proof. Since pi is finite for all i, therefore P is also finite, as the Cartesian product of
a finite number of finite sets. Indeed, P has cardinal equal to 2N , which is finite, since N is
a finite number. Therefore, by theorem8, Vi is continuous on P. This establishes property
(ii) and (iii) of a strictly supermodular game.
Third, to establish property (iv) , it suﬃces to prove the following claim:
Claim 2. For all i ∈ I, the function Vi : P → <, attains a maximum on P.
Proof. Since the set of feasible joint strategies reduced to P is finite and has no more
than 2N elements, we also have that Vi (P ) ⊂ < is also finite; and finite subsets of < always
contain their upper and lower bounds. It therefore follows that, Vi has a finite upper bound
on P . This completes the proof of this claim.
Fourth, the following claim establishes property (v) .
Claim 3. Under assumptions 1-3, the function Vi : P → < has increasing diﬀerences in
(pi, p−i) on Pi × P−i : for all i ∈ I, for all p0i > pi and p0−i > p−i,
Vi
¡
p0i, p0−i
¢
− Vi
¡
pi, p0−i
¢
≥ Vi (p0i, p−i)− Vi (pi, p−i) (III.2)
Proof. Let p0i > pi and p0−i > p−i and suppose,
Vi
¡
p0i, p0−i
¢
− Vi
¡
pi, p0−i
¢
< Vi (p0i, p−i)− Vi (pi, p−i) . (III.3)
Observe that inequality (III.3) can also be written as follow:
Vi
¡
p0i, p0−i
¢
− Vi (p0i, p−i) < Vi
¡
pi, p0−i
¢
− Vi (pi, p−i) . (III.4)
all i ∈ I.
Since pi ∈ {0, 1}, take p0i = 1 and pi = 0. Then, using the definition of Vi (.), it can be
shown that the strict inequality (III.4) reduces to
8Theorem (continuity with opened sets): Any function defined on a finite set is continuous.
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Π (n0)−Π (n∗) < 0. (III.5)
where
n0 = 1 +
X
j 6=i
p0j
n∗ = 1 +
X
j 6=i
pj
Since p0−i > p−i, its follows that n0 > n∗ by construction. Now, if n∗ < n0 < en (1),
then from (II.14), it follows that Π (n0) − Π (n∗) = 0 and we reach a contradiction. If
n∗ < en (1) ≤ n0 instead, then (III.5) reduces to
π¯ (1)− π (1) < 0. (III.6)
By using the Envelope theorem, one can easily show that inequality (III.6) leads to a
contradiction, since δ > 0 ( i.e., since r < er, by construction). Hence the result. This
completes the proof of proposition 4.
C. Proof of Lemma 2.
To prove Lemma 2, it suﬃces to show that given p−i ∈ P−i, and for all pairs ¡pLi , pHi ¢ ∈
Pi × Pi such that pLi 6= pHi , Vi
¡
pLi , p−i
¢ 6= Vi ¡pHi , p−i¢. Suppose by way of contradiction
that for some i ∈ I and for some bp−i ∈ P−i, we have
Vi
¡
pLi , bp−i¢ = Vi ¡pHi , bp−i¢ . (III.7)
Since Pi = {0, 1}, take pLi = 0 and pHi = 1. Then, we can rewrite (III.7) as follows:
Vi (0, bp−i) = Vi (1, bp−i) ,
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which, using the definition of function Vi, reduces to
π (0) = Π (bn) , (III.8)
where
bn = 1 +X
j 6=i
bpj
Now, if bn < en (1), then equality (III.8) reduces to
π (0) = π (1) , (III.9)
which is a contradiction since by Proposition 2, π(.) is a decreasing function, i.e.,π (0) >
π (1). If bn ≥ en (1), then (III.8) reduces
π (0) = π¯ (1) ,
which contradicts inequality (II.12).Hence the result.
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